Initial Security Audit
This document summarizes the findings of an initial security review performed on the AgentDock codebase (focusing on agentdock-core and the open source client layer). It identifies potential vulnerabilities, analyzes risks, and tracks actions taken or recommended.
Key:
- ✅ = Issue Addressed / Mitigated / Low Risk / Current State OK
- ⚠️ = Action Required / Future Enhancement / High Priority
1. API Key Handling and Security:
- Issue: Flexible API key management using environment variables and client-side
localStorage(viaSecureStorage). - Analysis: Offers flexibility suitable for the OS client.
SecureStorageuses AES-GCM encryption and HMAC, but is vulnerable to XSS attacks as encryption keys are also stored inlocalStorage. Environment variables depend on secure deployment configuration. Keys are masked in logs. - Status: ✅ (Current implementation acceptable for OS client, risks noted)
- Recommendation: ✅ Document
SecureStorageXSS risk clearly. Emphasize env vars/BYOK for production. (Documentation updated).
2. Input Validation:
- Issue: Ensuring comprehensive validation of all external inputs. Potential ReDoS risk in specific regex.
- Analysis: Zod validation is used effectively in key areas. ReDoS risk in
extractArxivIdassessed as low due to prior Zod validation. - Status: ✅ (Current validation good, risk low)
- Recommendation: ⚠️ Perform focused audit of remaining API inputs and
JSON.parsepoints for completeness.
3. Error Handling and Information Disclosure:
- Issue: Potential for verbose errors leaking internal details in production.
- Analysis: The
parseProviderErrorandnormalizeErrorsystem correctly sanitizes errors and conditionally excludes details in production based onNODE_ENV. - Status: ✅ (Mechanism prevents info disclosure in production)
- Recommendation: None (Ensure
NODE_ENVis set correctly in deployments).
4. Authentication and Authorization:
- Issue: Lack of explicit user authentication in
agentdock-core. Security relies on API key protection. - Analysis: User auth is intentionally out-of-scope for
agentdock-core. API key security relies on environment variables andSecureStorage(with its XSS risk). - Status: ✅ (Acknowledged scope, risk noted)
- Recommendation: ✅ Document
SecureStorageXSS risk and secure key management practices. (Documentation updated).
5. Data Handling and Storage:
- Issue: Default
MemoryStorageProvideris non-persistent. - Analysis: The framework defaults to non-persistent memory storage. Persistent options (
RedisStorageProvider,VercelKVProvider) are implemented and must be explicitly configured via environment variables for production. - Status: ✅ (Persistent options exist, but configuration required)
- Recommendation: ⚠️ Emphasize critical need for configuring Redis/Vercel KV in production documentation.
6. Code Structure and Common Errors:
- Issue: Potential inconsistencies in error handling patterns and lack of general retry mechanisms.
- Analysis:
agentdock-coreuses standardizedAgentError. The open source client layer usesconsole.errormore variably. General retry mechanism for transient errors is missing. - Status: ⚠️ (Inconsistencies and lack of retries identified)
- Recommendation: ⚠️ Standardize logging/API error responses in client layer. Implement general retry mechanism (e.g., exponential backoff) as future enhancement.
7. Dependencies:
- Issue: Vulnerabilities in dependencies.
- Analysis:
pnpm auditinitially found 1 critical (next) and 2 moderate (undici,esbuild) vulnerabilities. - Status: ✅ (Vulnerabilities resolved via updates and overrides)
- Recommendation: ✅ Perform regular dependency audits (
pnpm audit) and updates.
8. Browser Security (XSS):
- Issue: Use of
rehype-rawin Markdown components allows potential XSS. - Analysis: Risk medium/high (LLM output, community docs).
- Status: ✅ (Resolved by switching to
rehype-sanitize, testing confirmed OK) - Recommendation: Consider future sandboxing for Mermaid diagrams.
9. Rate Limiting and Resource Management:
- Issue: Lack of server-side API rate limiting and basic tool throttling.
- Analysis: No server-side rate limiting implemented (DoS risk). Tool throttling is basic (
sleep()). Internal plan exists for implementation. - Status: ⚠️ (Rate limiting not implemented)
- Recommendation: ⚠️ Implement server-side rate limiting (e.g., using
@upstash/ratelimitwith KV store) as planned internally (high priority). ⚠️ Improve tool throttling beyondsleep().
10. NoSQL Injection (if applicable):
- Issue: Potential future risk if NoSQL databases are added.
- Analysis: Not currently applicable to KV stores.
- Status: ✅ (Not applicable currently)
- Recommendation: Note for future database integrations.
General Recommendations
- ⚠️ Conduct regular security audits and penetration testing.
- ⚠️ Maintain clear security best practices documentation for users and contributors.
- ⚠️ Consider dedicated security code reviews before major releases.
Next Actions (Based on Audit)
- Documentation Updates:
- ✅ Clearly document the XSS risk associated with
SecureStorage(client-side API key storage) and recommend secure alternatives (env vars, BYOK). (Updated indocs/oss-client/nextjs-implementation.mdand linked fromdocs/roadmap/storage-abstraction.md). (See Issue 1, 4) - ⚠️ Emphasize the critical need for users to configure a persistent storage provider (Redis/Vercel KV) for production, detailing environment variable setup. (See Issue 5)
- ⚠️ Create/expand security best practices documentation covering key management, input validation principles, etc. (See General Recs)
- ✅ Clearly document the XSS risk associated with
- High Priority Implementation:
- ⚠️ Implement server-side API rate limiting based on the internal plan (using
@upstash/ratelimitor similar). (See Issue 9)
- ⚠️ Implement server-side API rate limiting based on the internal plan (using
- Future Enhancements / Code Improvements:
- ⚠️ Perform a focused audit of API inputs and
JSON.parsepoints to ensure comprehensive validation coverage. (See Issue 2) - ⚠️ Standardize logging (using structured
logger) and API error responses in the open source client layer. (See Issue 6) - ⚠️ Implement a general retry mechanism (e.g., exponential backoff) for external API calls (LLMs, tools). (See Issue 6)
- ⚠️ Improve tool throttling beyond simple
sleep()delays. (See Issue 9) - ⚠️ Consider sandboxing for Mermaid diagrams for future enhancement. (See Issue 8)
- ⚠️ Perform a focused audit of API inputs and
- Process Improvements:
- ✅ Establish a process for regular dependency audits (
pnpm audit). (Implicitly done by performing this audit, recommend formalizing) - ⚠️ Incorporate regular security reviews/audits into the development lifecycle. (See General Recs)
- ✅ Establish a process for regular dependency audits (
This audit provides a snapshot. Ongoing vigilance and security practices are crucial.